Under the Microscope: Divine Command Theory

Previously in a recent discussion on morality, "Divine Command Theory" came up.

Divine Command Theory, henceforth, DCT, will often pop up when the topic turns to morality, simply because theists who argue as moral objectivists claim that there exists a moral standard that is "Absolute" and that said standard comes from "God". "God" is the standard, they would argue. And moreover, in some but not all cases, the theist will argue that atheists must account for an objective morality if they reject that morality comes from a Divine source. This is false, but what atheists need to account for (or not) is for another discussion.

So, ethics - aka, "right" Vs "wrong" - are contended to be grounded in a theistic framework, claims the theist.

For example, Christians would likely say that the god of their bible is the moral standard, while Muslims would contend that morals come from "Allah", the god of the Holy Qu'ran.

Okay, so this essentially leaves *two choices for the people who claim to get their moral standard from "God": Either, 1) God can command anything at all and it is seen as "good" by sheer virtue of the command coming from "God", or 2) God commands certain things because certain things are "good", and by extension, God would refrain from commanding things that are "bad"(or "evil").

*if I've left an option out, I'm willing to have a listen to what that might be, preferably with examples. 

Option 1 is more or less DCT, encapsulated.

Here's how Wikipedia defines the term:

Also known as theological voluntarism, [DCT] is a meta-ethical theory which proposes that an action's status as morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God. 

Perhaps the biggest clue here that something is amiss is the word "whether", because it's implicit that there's some contingency or stipulations to be found. In other words, we're being reasonable to conclude that "or not" is implied, as in, "an action's status as morally good is equivalent to whether or not it is commanded by God."

So, if certain things might not be commanded by God, the very first question we must ask, is why not? Who or what would prevent even God from commanding certain things if this God is presumably where the buck stops? Not to mention, the very notion that there would exist a "who" or a "what" that would prevent God from commanding certain things should be all the evidence that anyone needs to conclude that DCT completely crumbles if anything or anyone exists that might prevent God from commanding certain things.

In the past what I've used as an example was the command to kill all non-Christians. The response I got, in short, was that "God" would not command such a thing because if he did, then he/she/it wouldn't be "God".

I guess this depends on which "God" we're talking about, because in both the Bible and the Qu'ran, passages can be found commanding the death of the respective infidels.

In fact, in Luke 19:27, the bible states....

But those enemies of mine who did not want me to be king over them—bring them here and kill them in front of me.

Nice, huh? Okay, well, to be fair, according to some apologists, Jesus is speaking in parable here. Fine. So what is parable mostly used for? It's used to illustrate some finer, spiritual lesson.

So, here, the finer spiritual lesson is evidently that it's in one's best interest to be Jesus' disciple. 

But rather than debate the "true" meaning of what was intended, I prefer to just use other examples. For instance, if God commanded our soldiers to secure the children of our enemies and to then dash their heads against rocks, the question we can rightfully ask, is this:  Does dashing the heads of children become the "moral" thing to do if God commands it? By the way, no Christian can use the, "God wouldn't be God if God commanded that", defense, because in this instance, it is clear that we have the OT deity of the bible, aka, "Yahweh", commanding precisely that. (Psalm 137:9) There's even a special twist, because said God is not saying that this act should be done regrettably, but instead, that we should feel "blessed" or righteous to perform such an act.

While this example might not put all theists in the hot seat, it most definitely puts Christian theists in a bit of a quandary, because assuming their deity actually has a referent in reality for sake of discussion, what if Christians were commanded such things today? How, exactly, would Christians respond to such commands? If one subscribes to DCT, then, in theory, such a despicable act and others just like it, become "moral" by mere virtue of the command coming from God, who we are to believe is the objective Moral-Giver.

So? What's stopping you? What would stop you from following such orders?

It seems to me that the only option would be to flat-out disobey God. In fact, from where I sit, that would be the one and only choice; the right choice. After all, there is nothing inherently "good" about following orders.

Consider that human beings have followed the orders of sinister people since time immemorial. Horrible, despicable acts, all carried out because people evidently either couldn't think for themselves or were too afraid to disobey. And again, some theists would surely be quick to point out that atheist dictators commanded evil things, too, and while I would not deny this, I would contend that they did this, not because they didn't have enough religion, but because they were following the tenets of religion a little too closely.

And let's examine something else: When a child follows the orders of a parent, is that child making a moral judgement? I would contend that, no, the child isn't making a moral judgement. Sure, said child is a free agent, but he or she is neither being moral, or immoral; he or she is just following orders. The end.

Most of us as normal, reasonable adults know that we must filter anything we're told to do, whether it comes from a person of authority, or not, through our own, innate sense of right and wrong. If it's contended that this "screening" process is totally subjective, and therefore, unacceptable, you know, since it's based on nothing outside or independent of ourselves, then he who contends this must consider that with DCT this is no different. The mindset, "Yeah, but this is God we're taking about!" amounts to special pleading, and at the end of the day, it ends up being a circular argument.

So, something's got to give, here. The one and only way that DCT can "work" as defined above is if the moral objectivist who's advocating said theory follows, without question or apprehension, any and every command or order that God gives them. The DCT proponent doesn't get to sit back and say, "Hmm, is this something that God would command?" To be apprehensive of, or to flat-out disobey such commands, instantly suggests that one is evoking their own, subjective sense of right and wrong and then projecting the conclusion onto the situation, which of course then flies in the face of the very idea of DCT.

There's no "wiggle room" here, folks.  If one wants to introduce things like "wiggle room" and nuance when one talks ethics, fine, but then they are talking situational ethics, not anything Absolute.